Thoughts on nuclear weapon use

[misterx]

If we have them, we ought to speculate on how to use them. Otherwise, why have them, right? This speculation should not go as far as actually defining what circumstances would justify the use of a nuke, that wouldn't be healthy. Our efforts should instead be aimed at determining the most strategic and efficient way to use them for offensive, defensive, and deterrent purposes. The USA military will be most effective if traditional military force and nuclear weaponry are combined.

First, one must remember that while our first-strike use of a nuclear weapon would be abhorrent to the international community, there is *no customary or conventional international law which prohibits nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict*. That's good news, because like any military action, the decision to use nuclear weapons is driven by the political objective sought. The USA specifically rejects a "no first use" policy on nuclear weapons. As long as the loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete, direct military advantage expected to be gained, we are good to go. Benefits of using our nuclear capabilities include minimizing collateral damage and reducing the probability of escalation.

Moving forward, the development of new nuclear weapon systems is indispensable, especially as the size of our deployed nuclear arsenal is reduced. Obviously, the use of nuclear weapons can have grave consequences for friend and foe alike, so ample justification is needed for their use. For example, consider a commander in a regional conflict such as Iraq. The commander should only request presidential approval for nuclear weapon use in the following circumstances:
- if an enemy is planning the imminent use of WMD's against the USA
- if an enemy is planning the imminent use of WMD's against one of our allies, or our interests
- if the enemy plans a biological attack that only nuclear weapon effects can destroy
- if there is need to destroy hardened enemy facilities housing WMD's
- if we need to defeat overwhelming conventional enemy forces (in other words, if we're losing a conventional war)
- to rapidly end a war in our favor
- to win, in general
- aw hell, just to prove we'd nuke something*

Now, before you jump my case over these thoughts, I didn't say they were *my* thoughts. The above represents the thinking of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a document entitled "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations", authored in mid 2005. Obviously, I paraphrased some, but I didn't misrepresent our policies. I just made the bravado more obvious. :) The copy I am reading is not the final version, as can be seen by some of the red revision marks, but I believe it substantially represents our current policies regarding tactical and theater nuclear warfare. Scary, isn't it? But don't take my word for it, read it yourself:
http://zfacts.com/metaPage/lib/zFacts_2005_03_15_Joint_Nuclear_Operations.pdf

It's interesting to see some of the changes that were marked out though. For instance, "rogue states" are changed to "regional states" in several places, and the following sentences:

In a developing crisis, the augmentation capability [our ability to bring nukes out of storage and put them into action - mrx] may be required to increase the number of Operationally Deployed Strategic Nuclear Warheads (ODSNW) above the limits of the Moscow Treaty. Such a change to the US operational nuclear force level could only be considered following a US withdrawal from the Moscow Treaty and appropriate action by the President and the Congress.

were changed to:

In a developing crisis, the augmentation capability may be required to change the mix of ODSNW.

See, isn't that neater? None of that worry about breaking treaties and stuff. Handy, clean!


*if you think I made this up, check page 47 of the pdf, item 1.g.